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Christophe Guilluy’s France Périphérique and the absence of 
race from Michel Houellebecq’s Sérotonine
Fraser McQueen
Literature and Languages, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland
ABSTRACT
Sérotonine (2019) is Michel Houellebecq’s most overtly politically 
engaged novel to date: the novel’s content and the framing strate-
gies that Houellebecq employed at the time of its publication 
converge to encourage readers to interpret the views expressed 
therein as Houellebecq’s own. This holds particularly true in relation 
to the apparently genuine concern that Sérotonine exudes for the 
regions of France that geographer Christophe Guilluy labels ‘la 
France périphérique’. Reading Houellebecq’s novel alongside the 
work of Guilluy, for whom Houellebecq has expressed respect, also 
helps to explain the surprising absence of protagonists who express 
racist views against French citizens of postcolonial immigrant des-
cent, or depictions of race-related conflict, from Sérotonine. That 
absence does not imply a corresponding absence of racism. Rather, 
excluding non-white French populations from his narrative allows 
Houellebecq to echo Guilluy by implicitly excluding them from 
both the marginalized communities for which his novel expresses 
such concern and, more broadly, the category of ‘French’.
RÉSUMÉ
Sérotonine (2019) est, jusqu’à présent, le roman de Michel 
Houellebecq le plus ouvertement politiquement engagé: et le 
contenu du roman et les stratégies de cadrage que Houellebecq 
a employé dans les semaines autour de sa publication encouragent 
le lecteur à interpréter les prises de position qui y sont articulées 
comme celles de Houellebecq lui-même. Cette observation est 
particulièrement pertinente en ce qui concerne la préoccupation, 
apparemment sincère, qui en ressort pour les régions de la France 
que le géographe Christophe Guilluy a baptisées ‘la France 
périphérique’. Houellebecq a exprimé publiquement son respect 
pour Guilluy; une lecture croisée de Sérotonine avec les travaux de 
ce dernier permet d’expliquer l’absence surprenante de personna-
ges qui expriment des opinions racistes envers les citoyens français 
issus de l’immigration postcoloniale, ou de représentations de 
conflit lié à la race, du roman. Cette absence n’implique pas que 
le racisme soit également absent. Au contraire, le fait d’exclure les 
populations françaises non-blanches de son ouvrage permet à 
Houellebecq, tout comme Guilluy, de les exclure de façon implicite 
des communautés marginalisées pour lesquelles son roman 
exprime tant de préoccupation, et, plus globalement, de la 
catégorie de ‘Français’.
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In a May 2017 television interview, Michel Houellebecq lamented his own ignorance 
regarding the political concerns of ‘la France . . . qui hésite entre Marine Le Pen et rien’: 
populations living outside of big cities, marginalized by economic globalization. His lack 
of understanding of the preoccupations of people living in ‘les zones périphériques 
décrites pas Christophe Guilluy’ constituted, he said, ‘une faute professionnelle assez 
lourde’ for a contemporary novelist (Sgherri 2017). His most recent novel, Sérotonine 
(2019b), reads like an attempt to redress that failing. Its narrator, Florent-Claude, leaves 
his Paris home for Normandy, seeing for himself the impoverishment of inhabitants of 
rural and peri-urban France; their anger at that situation fuels rural unrest that erupts into 
violence. This article explores how Houellebecq’s novel depicts the problems facing these 
regions, and particularly how its problematic racialization of them as white echoes ideas 
popularized by the geographer Guilluy.
It approaches the issue by discussing two striking features of Sérotonine. Firstly, the 
novel is Houellebecq’s most overtly politically engaged to date, exuding distress at the 
dire situation facing inhabitants of what Guilluy labels ‘la France périphérique’, personi-
fied in Florent’s friend Aymeric d’Harcourt. Seth Armus (2017) and Russell Williams (2019) 
note that the last novel Houellebecq wrote before Sérotonine, Soumission (2015a), was 
already more obviously engaged than his earlier fiction, although they diverge over how 
this impacts the novel’s literary qualities. Armus (2017, 127–128) sees a ‘serious work of 
engagement’, in which ‘Houellebecq sets a brilliant tableau’ of contemporary France; 
Williams (2019, 74–75) describes the more overt politics of Soumission, which includes 
numerous dog whistles aligning its contents with hard-right discourses. as rendering it 
‘ultimately less inventive’ than Houellebecq’s earlier works. This paper agrees with the 
latter position, arguing that Sérotonine continues a shift from the literary towards the 
quasi-polemical that Houellebecq started in Soumission.
The second notable feature of Sérotonine that the essay explores is a surprising 
absence of the references to racial tensions that are consistently present in 
Houellebecq’s earlier novels. Reading the novel alongside Guilluy’s work, the paper 
argues that the near disappearance of such material does not imply that Houellebecq’s 
views on race have evolved; rather, excluding non-white French people of postcolonial 
immigrant descent from his narrative allows him to echo Guilluy by excluding them from 
both the marginalized communities for whom Sérotonine expresses such concern and the 
broader category of ‘French’. The article’s central argument is thus that, while the novel 
contains little overt racism against postcolonial immigrants to France or their descen-
dants, enough evidence remains to suggest that it reproduces a deeply problematic racial 
politics: a politics echoing the arguments of both Guilluy and a broader transnational hard 
and far right.
Christophe Guilluy
Before exploring how Sérotonine’s depiction of France resonates with Guilluy’s ideas, it 
will be helpful to briefly summarize those which are most relevant. Since the mid-2000s, 
Guilluy has been arguing that a growing divide separates France’s twenty-five (an appar-
ently arbitrary number) biggest cities, which have profited from capitalist globalization, 
and a ‘France périphérique’ impoverished by the same economic developments. His 
diagnosis differs from the classic description of an urban-rural split dividing French 
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society, his ‘France périphérique’ including peri-urban areas and small towns that would 
normally be considered urban alongside rural regions: peripheral France, put simply, is 
everything that is too far from the ‘métropoles mondialisées’ to be anything other than 
impoverished by economic globalization (Guilluy 2014, 26–32).
Although critics deride Guilluy’s analysis as simplistic and methodologically question-
able (see for example Ballif et al. 2018), such criticisms are not this article’s focus. For the 
current purposes, more problematic still are the racialized underpinnings of his argu-
ments Although he partly blames gentrification for the problems of working-class com-
munities in peripheral France, whom he argues were forced out of the metropolises when 
an influx of highly qualified workers drove up house prices, he also blames immigration. 
He (2014, 40–42) claims without supporting evidence that mass migration has forced 
what he labels ‘les catégories populaires traditionnelles’, or ‘d’origine française ou d’im-
migration ancienne’, barely disguised dog whistles for white people, out of traditional 
working-class metropolitan neighbourhoods. They do not, he (2014, 134, 139–141) 
argues, want to ‘devenir minoritaire’ in these neighbourhoods, and particularly the 
banlieues of big cities; he apparently considers this ‘insécurité culturelle’ wholly justified. 
He thus restricts his concern for the ‘catégories populaires’ to those of them who are 
white, implying that non-white working-class people do not share their problems, and 
even help cause them. At times, Guilluy echoes the discourse of the grand remplacement 
conspiracy theory popularized by far-right polemicist Renaud Camus (2011), who claims 
that postcolonial immigrants and their descendants wish to ‘replace’ France’s ‘native’ 
whites: Guilluy (2014, 13–14, 47–48, 64–65) blames the rising Rassemblement national 
(RN) vote in southern France on the juxtaposition of ‘une population autochtone vieillis-
sante et une population d’origine immigrée plus jeune’, claiming that ‘la substitution des 
populations . . . est dans tous [sic] les têtes’.
Among the numerous problematic aspects of Guilluy’s arguments, he implies that 
peripheral France is entirely white and the banlieues are entirely non-white. Ignoring the 
more complex demographic reality enables him to treat the problems of peripheral 
France and those of a putative ‘white working class’ as synonymous, claiming, for 
example, that:
Majoritairement concentrés dans les quartiers de logements sociaux des grandes métropoles, 
les immigrés bénéficient d’un accès aux zones d’emploi les plus actives du pays. À l’inverse, 
beaucoup d’ouvriers non immigrés vivent en dehors des zones d’emplois les plus actives, 
souvent dans cette France périphérique et industrielle en crise (Guilluy 2014, 40-41).
That Guilluy refers to non-white populations indiscriminately as ‘les immigrés’, not differ-
entiating between actual immigrants and their French-born descendants, hints at how 
legitimately French he considers them to be. He underlines his assumption that metro-
politan and peripheral working-class districts are effectively racially segregated by blam-
ing immigration, rather than globalized economics, for social problems in the former. He 
(2014, 13–14) claims that ‘si les difficultés des banlieues sont réelles, elles sont d’abord 
liées à l’émergence d’une société multiculturelle et à la gestion des flux migratoires, mais 
en aucun cas aux retombées d’une économie mondialisée’. By blaming immigration and 
multiculturalism, rather than globalized economics, for problems facing the banlieues like 
unemployment or high crime rates, Guilluy suggests that such issues are generated by the 
putative cultural alterity of their inhabitants; the implication appears to be that these 
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racialized populations are congenitally criminal. He even claims that they benefit from 
globalization, rather than being harmed by it like their peripheral compatriots. The 
metropolitan job market ‘ne s’adresse plus à tout le monde, mais surtout aux plus 
qualifiés et aux peu ou pas qualifiés’; the geographical proximity of (non-white) metro-
politan working-class populations to that job market grants them, but not (white) per-
ipheral populations, access to unqualified jobs in the metropolises (Guilluy 2014, 8–9, 
13–14). Guilluy apparently does not consider that being restricted to precarious, poorly 
paid employment and dilapidated social housing looks more like exploitation than 
inclusion.
For Guilluy, then, the problems globalized economics cause for peripheral France and 
those he believes white French people face in an increasingly ethnically diverse nation are 
indistinguishable. He thus uses language traditionally associated with the political left, 
critiquing the impacts of neoliberal globalization on working-class populations. In prac-
tice, however, his arguments are often barely distinguishable from those of the far right. 
He (2020, 62–63) claims, for example, that ‘c’est en cassant le rythme d’une immigration 
perpétuelle que les pouvoirs publics pourraient agir sur le contexte social’. Even when he 
argues for greater social protections, then, he explicitly underlines his belief that such 
reforms can only be implemented if immigration is first reduced.
It is, then, unsurprising that hard and far-right political actors have embraced 
Guilluy’s work, which allows them to characterize xenophobic policies as representing 
working-class interests while obscuring the socio-economic drivers of class inequality. 
Under Laurent Wauquiez’s leadership, Les Républicains (LR) were the party to do so 
most overtly, reproducing both Guilluy’s territorial analysis and his dog whistle racism 
(Albertini 2020). The RN have less explicitly adopted Guilluy’s territorial analysis, remain-
ing more attached to a traditional urban/rural binary, but their rhetoric has markedly 
shifted towards a similar use of pseudo-leftist language to promote traditional far-right 
solutions (see Mondon and Winter 2020, 109–112). The shift has, at least partly, been 
legitimated by reactionaries who identify as part of the left like Guilluy or Jean-Claude 
Michéa (2017).
Such discourses reflect a broader international context in which hard-right politicians 
and their supporters claim to represent an embattled ‘white working class’. In March 2016, 
Fox News described then U.S. presidential candidate (and billionaire property heir) Donald 
Trump as ‘the working-class candidate’; on the day of the 2016 referendum on the United 
Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, right-wing tabloid The Daily Express 
labelled the Brexit movement a ‘working-class revolution’ (cited in Mondon and Winter 
2020, 107–108). This transnational hard-right often echo Guilluy by using territorial 
inequalities as a rhetorical tool to split the working class along racial lines. In 
October 2016, prior to Trump’s election victory, former United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) leader (and former banker) Nigel Farage wrote that ‘blue-collar workers in the 
valleys of South Wales angry with Chinese steel dumping voted Brexit in their droves. In 
the American rust belt, traditional manufacturing industries have declined, and it is to 
these people that Trump speaks very effectively’ (cited in Mondon and Winter 2020, 
107–108). As Aurélien Mondon and Aaron Winter (2020, 109) note, racializing working- 
class communities outside of large towns as white, and scapegoating non-white people as 
partly to blame for their struggles, distracts attention from socio-economic solutions that 
might help working-class people (white or otherwise):
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The elite, seen as out of touch and contemptuous, is still targeted through populism. Yet the 
real enemy is clearly the other, whether immigrants, Muslims, refugees or their allies. In this 
discourse, it is them, not the elite, who threaten jobs and resources. The construction of 
a “white working class” is therefore a displacement of rightful anger in the form of a struggle 
in which the enemy is defined only by race, ethnicity or foreign nationality rather than class 
(Mondon and Winter 2020, 115–116).
If Guilluy validates the claims of the French hard right to represent the ‘peripheral’ 
working class, the broader transnational hard right also has its enablers. Political scientists 
Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin claimed that the 2016 Brexit vote was fuelled by a ‘left 
behind’ working class in deindustrialized regions, who feared a loss of cultural identity in 
‘a more diverse and rapidly changing Britain’ (cited in Mondon and Winter 2020, 107–108). 
Venture capitalist J.D. Vance, meanwhile, echoed Farage’s suggestion that the overtly 
racist Trump appealed to impoverished working classes in rural America (cited in Mondon 
and Winter 2020, 107–108). Guilluy himself has echoed the latter claim, questionably 
transposing his own work from the French context into that of the U.S. by claiming that:
C’est “l’Amérique périphérique” qui a voté Trump, celle des territoires désindustrialisés et 
ruraux qui est aussi celle des ouvriers, employés, travailleurs indépendants ou paysans. Ceux 
qui étaient hier au cœur de la machine économique en sont aujourd’hui bannis (Pétreault 
2016).
Mondon and Winter (2020, 101, 109–119) note that such claims are based on misrepre-
sentation. Once factors like abstention are accounted for, claims that recent far-right 
electoral gains in France, the U.K., and the U.S.A. have been enabled by a surge of 
working-class support outside large towns do not withstand scrutiny. Neither the far 
right nor commentators like Guilluy represent a ‘white working class’ so much as they 
ventriloquize it to legitimize themselves as voices of ‘the people’ (a concept with which 
the working class is typically assumed to have a privileged relationship, even if this rarely 
translates into redistributive economic policies). Not only the racism of commentators like 
Guilluy must be challenged, but so should their claim to speak even for those working- 
class people who are white.
Sérotonine, political engagement, and the European Union
Houellebecq’s novel does neither, instead depicting its protagonist, Florent-Claude, tra-
velling through an impoverished peripheral France that recalls Guilluy’s descriptions. 
Depressed, Florent-Claude abandons an unfulfilling life working for the Ministère de 
l’agriculture in Paris to visit aristocrat turned dairy farmer Aymeric in Normandy. After 
his friend commits suicide during a stand-off with riot police at a demonstration against E. 
U. agricultural policies, Florent-Claude continues chasing the happiness of his youth: 
remaining in Normandy, he tracks down his beloved ex-girlfriend Camille, who left him 
several years earlier after he was unfaithful. However, he cannot summon the courage to 
approach her, returns to Paris, and ends the novel waiting to die in an anonymous studio 
apartment.
The predicament of Aymeric, who graduated with Florent from the Institut national 
agronomique, symbolizes Houellebecq’s perception of the problems facing peripheral 
France. Upon graduation, Aymeric spurned a conventional career path in the agri-food 
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industry, instead following his passion by opening a dairy farm ‘basé sur une production 
raisonnable et de qualité’. His profitability has, however, been hamstrung from the outset 
by unfavourable E.U. legislation and competition from unethical multinationals 
(Houellebecq 2019b, 258–259). By the time Florent visits, he is an alcoholic, depressed 
divorcee, only remaining afloat financially by gradually selling off his family’s ancestral 
lands. His fellow local dairy farmers, with no excess land to sell, are still more desperate. 
Farmers’ union leader Frank laments to Florent that three have killed themselves since 
the year began: a particularly shocking revelation given that he makes it mere weeks after 
new year’s eve (Houellebecq 2019b, 239–240).
Houellebecq leaves no ambiguity over who is to blame for the impoverishment of 
French farmers, with several well-informed protagonists citing E.U. policies. These include 
Florent himself, who has spent most of his professional career in civil service roles 
supporting and developing French agriculture in a European context, and is considered 
one of France’s foremost experts in this area. This anti-Europeanism mirrors Houellebecq’s 
own longstanding antipathy to the European project. He has consistently critiqued the E. 
U. as both undemocratic and a threat to national cultural specificities, describing his 
opposition to it as his ‘only political engagement’ (Sweeney 2019, 54–55). Although 
Houellebecq gave no interviews to promote Sérotonine’s publication, in his one contem-
poraneous public intervention he (2019a) reiterated that stance by stating that France 
would ‘become totally independent once again when the European Union is dissolved 
(the sooner, the better)’. He (2019a) did not mention his novel in this article, published in 
English by Harper’s Magazine, but both criticized the E.U. and praised protectionist 
economic measures like those enacted by then President Trump, echoing views Florent 
expresses in Sérotonine. Significantly, these positions also recall those of the transnational 
far right discussed above.
By underlining Houellebecq’s own endorsement of his protagonist’s views, the Harper’s 
article invited readers to identify the former with the latter: an identification already 
implied, in typically Houellebecqian fashion, by their shared biographical details, both 
having studied at the Institut national agronomique. Equally, that Houellebecq’s only 
contemporaneous public intervention was polemical, not even mentioning literature, 
invited readers to view him as much as a political commentator as a novelist. Both 
functions converge to promote reading strategies focussed less on Sérotonine’s imagina-
tive qualities than what the novel says about Houellebecq’s views regarding contempor-
ary political debates. This continued a pattern that Williams (2019) notes Houellebecq first 
set when Soumission was published in 2015. His comments regarding the earlier novel 
similarly encouraged readers to interpret it more straightforwardly as reflecting his own 
politics than was the case of his previous fiction: in a radio interview, for example, he 
claimed that the Islamist takeover of France depicted therein was a plausible long-term 
outcome, thus stressing not his imaginative freedom as a literary author, but the puta-
tively realistic nature of his plot. This characterization of the novel both invited readers to 
interpret it as a diagnosis of France’s contemporary political situation and echoed the 
language of far-right ideologues like Camus or Eric Zemmour, who claim that Muslims 
intend to ‘Islamize’ France and Europe. An article that he (2015b) wrote that November for 
the New York Times further encouraged readers to interpret his novel through the lens of 
Islamophobic right-wing discourses. Following the November 13th jihadi attacks in Paris, 
Houellebecq claimed that Muslim immigration to France posed a security threat, calling 
6 F. MCQUEEN
for tightened border controls. Like in the later Harper’s article, he did not mention 
literature, situating himself solely as a political commentator (Williams 2019, 73–74). 
Both Houellebecq’s framing of Soumission and his extra-literary public interventions 
thus encouraged readings of his novel as reproducing his own politics, and particularly 
an apparent affinity with the hard right. Williams (2019, 70–73) adds that such readings 
are further encouraged by the presence in the novel of numerous ‘dog whistles’ linking 
Houellebecq’s narrative to the work of right-wing polemicists like Zemmour or Alain 
Finkielkraut.
Williams (2019, 46–47) and Carole Sweeney (2019, 67–68) both note the withering 
away in Soumission of what Martin Crowley (2002, 22–26) labelled the ‘insulating framing 
devices’ that problematized straightforward attributions of the controversial views 
expressed in Houellebecq’s earlier novels to their author. Racist or misogynistic views 
were, for example, previously expressed only by protagonists who explicitly stated their 
own unreliability. Alternatively, whether such views were being expressed by protago-
nists or an apparently omniscient narrator, and the extent to which that narrator spoke for 
the author, might be left unclear; equally, Houellebecq’s earlier novels could be inter-
preted as including such views to denounce rather than promote them. These ‘insulating 
frames’ did not entirely distance Houellebecq from the troubling views his protagonists 
expressed, but left a pervasive doubt over whether, or how far, they reflected the author’s 
own (Crowley 2002, 26–27).
Williams (2019) adds that Houellebecq’s earlier novels further distanced themselves 
from political readings by depicting obviously fantastic solutions even when they 
engaged with real-world problems, implicitly highlighting the imaginative autonomy of 
fiction. Soumission’s depiction of Europe embracing Islam is rather less imaginative than, 
for example, the replacement of humanity with a superior posthuman species, again 
reducing the distance between Houellebecq’s fiction and contemporary political dis-
courses. Houellebecq observed at the time of Soumission’s publication that he knew of 
no novel that had changed the course of history. Williams (2019, 74–75) suggests that 
Soumission may, then, have represented a deliberate ‘movement away from the exclu-
sively literary’ towards a ‘less undecidable, less ambiguous’, and more overtly political, 
form of writing that Houellebecq perhaps considered capable of having a greater political 
impact.
Sérotonine supports Williams’s argument, which he made before it was published. In 
January 2019, Houellebecq intervened in public discourse solely as a polemical political 
commentator, undermining purely literary readings of his novel still more than he had 
when Soumission was published. Although in 2015 he highlighted his belief that 
Soumission depicted a plausible scenario, he remained willing to discuss it as literature. 
He also maintained some ambiguity regarding how the novel should be read. In one 
interview, he claimed to have portrayed the Islamization of France as beneficial to the 
nation, stating that, having re-read the Qur’an, it was ‘plutôt mieux que je ne pensais’, and 
‘les djihadistes [étaient] de mauvais musulmans’ (Bourmeau 2015). Several months later, 
however, he criticized a putative ‘discours . . . bien rodé’ characterizing Islam as ‘une 
religion de paix’, and praised commentators who stigmatize the Muslim faith as a threat 
to the Republic for refusing to ‘nier l’évidence’ (Toranian and de Viry 2015, 18–19). His 
words destabilized his earlier claim to now view Islam more positively than before, re- 
opening the possibility that his intent in writing Soumission was to stigmatize Muslims 
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and their religion as a threat to France. His conflicting framings of the novel converge to 
leave readers a degree of interpretative autonomy, even if his implicit assumption in both 
interviews that most French Muslims would support an Islamist political party remains 
problematic regardless.
His one public intervention at the time of Sérotonine’s publication, the Harper’s article, 
left no such ambiguity, underlining that the anti-Europeanism expressed in the novel 
mirrors his own politics. Moreover, the scenario Sérotonine depicts is still further from the 
fantastic outcomes of Houellebecq’s earlier fiction than that of Soumission, the greatest 
technological innovation he imagines being the development of a new anti-depressant. 
Crowley considers the unreliability of his narrators to be another insulating frame in 
Houellebecq’s pre-2005 fiction: their misogynistic views can be interpreted as undercut 
by their own status as embittered romantic failures. This argument remains pertinent in 
relation to Florent’s misogyny, but holds less true regarding his criticisms of E. 
U. agricultural policies: as noted above, he is a recognized expert in this specific area. In 
one professional role, he has even played ‘un certain rôle dans l’élaboration de la position 
française sur le budget agricole européen’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 111–112, 182–183). If 
Florent is an expert on only one issue, it is European agricultural policies. The similarity of 
his criticisms of the E.U. to Houellebecq’s own further undercuts any suggestion that 
Florent’s views should be read as ironic.
Indeed, the techniques through which Houellebecq once distanced himself from his 
protagonists have largely disappeared from Sérotonine. Williams (2019, 64–65) notes, for 
example, that La Possibilité d’une île’s narrator, Daniel, is clearly a caricature of 
Houellebecq. Following the controversy aroused by Plateforme’s virulently racist, 
Islamophobic, and misogynistic content, it was surely no coincidence that an overtly 
Islamophobic and misogynistic millionaire comedian narrated his next novel. However, 
Houellebecq undercut any straightforward identification of Daniel with himself by having 
his protagonist add ‘pseudo-paedophilic’ comments to statements that otherwise 
recalled things Houellebecq had said elsewhere. His narrative strategies thus played 
with readerly desires to conflate author and protagonist, apparently encouraging them 
to do so while adding material that seemed calculated to undermine any pleasure they 
might take from it. Florent is not distanced from Houellebecq in this way. Far from 
expressing pseudo-paedophilic desires of his own, he passively observes the actions of 
a paedophile, recalling Houellebecq’s own ambivalent textual reproductions of such 
unsavoury material: he keeps his promise to a man whom he witnesses abusing 
a young girl that ‘je ne dirai rien à personne’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 217–218). Where La 
Possibilité d’une île’s paedophilic content seemed calculated to destabilize readerly desires 
to identify Houellebecq with his protagonists, Florent’s role as a detached observer of 
child abuse amplifies such an identification.
Florent comes close to explicitly urging readers to identify him with Houellebecq by 
musing that ‘le terme d’autofiction ne m’évoqu[e] que des idées imprécises . . . toujours 
est-il [qu’il] me sembl[e] de plus en plus que le mot conv[ient] à ma situation, qu’il 
[a] même été inventé pour moi’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 157–158). It is unclear how the 
word ‘autofiction’, however defined, could relate to the situation of Florent, who writes no 
fiction, autobiographical or otherwise. His remarks make more sense, however, if inter-
preted as Houellebecq himself overtly encouraging the reader to assume that his novel 
has some autobiographical element. The section breaks down, even if only temporarily, 
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the barrier between Houellebecq and Florent; if any insulating frame remains to separate 
the author from the views of his protagonist, it is as flimsy as his unwillingness to define 
‘autofiction’.
One important qualification is necessary. Crowley argues that the insulating frames in 
Houellebecq’s earlier novels ‘make it impossible to accuse Houellebecq of embracing the 
offensive material he presents’ (Crowley 2002, 21–22, my emphasis). The views expressed 
in Sérotonine that Houellebecq encourages readers to interpret as his own are primarily 
criticisms of the E.U. Although critics like Emmanuel Berretta (2019) accuse him of 
misrepresenting E.U. policies, his criticisms are not inherently offensive like the misogy-
nistic views to which Crowley refers. This article argues that the vision of race under-
pinning Sérotonine is problematic; the convergence between Florent’s views on Europe 
and Houellebecq’s own helps justify the assertion that the novel reflects Houellebecq’s 
own politics. However, this does not mean that misgivings with the European project in 
themselves necessarily signify racism (even if anti-E.U. sentiment is undoubtedly a feature 
of the far-right discourses evoked above).
By apparently encouraging readers to conflate the views expressed in Sérotonine with 
his own, Houellebecq accelerated the move from the literary towards the polemical that 
Williams had already noted. Accordingly, critical reception of Houellebecq and his work 
has increasingly focussed on his politics. In December 2020, Le Nouvel Observateur 
published an article entitled ‘Houellebecq est-il d’extrême droite?’, asking five longstand-
ing associates of the author to situate him politically. Several interviewees discussed 
a perceived proximity between Houellebecq and the form of hard-right pseudo-leftism 
described above, Aurélien Bellanger describing him as ‘une sorte de marxiste de droite’ 
(Caviglioli and Grégoire 2020). That the views expressed in Houellebecq’s fiction have 
become so difficult to separate from the figure of the author also reflects deeper features 
of the contemporary media/literary landscape in France and elsewhere. Ashley Harris 
(2020, 34–35, 39) notes that as ‘cultural value has become ever more closely linked to 
commodification and marketing’, authors have increasingly needed to become media 
celebrities, utilizing their public personas to help promote their works. As Jérôme Meizoz 
(2016) puts it, ‘la modernité médiatique a substitué au livre son auteur audible, visible ou 
télévisuel’.
These comments hold particularly true of Houellebecq, who has consciously filled the 
quasi-celebrity role that Harris labels ‘écrivain médiatique’. As well as positioning himself 
as a political commentator, he has expanded his creative output beyond the novel to 
include multiple other forms. He has also cultivated a provocative public persona, expres-
sing himself in ways reflecting the controversial content of his fiction, and publicizing 
aspects of his private life, for example by publishing his wedding photographs shortly 
before Sérotonine. He has further amplified his own public status even within his fictional 
oeuvre by depicting caricatured versions of himself, for instance when he included 
himself as a protagonist in La Carte et la territoire (2016 [2010]). As Harris (2020, 36–37) 
puts it, such moves form ‘part of a larger strategy to “re-birth” the author in response to 
the contemporary mediatised context’, stimulating book sales by increasing 
Houellebecq’s own visibility and notoriety.
Cultivating his personal brand in this way has been integral to Houellebecq’s success, 
but, as Harris (2020, 36–37) notes, has further blurred the boundaries between the author 
and his works: ‘at the mere sight of the name of the écrivain médiatique, assumptions 
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about the author come to mind and the text is regarded within the specific restraints that 
these bring’. The interpretation of Houellebecq’s works can no longer be abstracted from 
his public persona: they are treated as reflecting his own politics and vice versa (Harris 
2020, 38). While Houellebecq’s two most recent novels validate ‘political’ readings more 
overtly than his earlier fiction, the contemporary media/literary environment and 
Houellebecq’s conscious embrace of the status of écrivain médiatique equally encourage 
such readings.
This post-Barthesian rebirth of the author helps render meaningful a reading of 
Houellebecq’s fiction alongside Guilluy’s polemical interventions. Both writers occupy 
a public position somewhere between their primary role (novelist and geographer 
respectively) and celebrity: if critics eagerly await Houellebecq’s new releases, Saïd 
Mahrane (2020) equally notes that ‘un livre de Christophe Guilluy est toujours un 
événement’. Guilluy has arguably slid into self-caricature in consequence. Between 2016 
and 2020 he published three new essays, as many as in the decade separating 2004 and 
2014, despite having little new to say. Reviewing the famously nostalgic (if not reaction-
ary) geographer’s latest text, Le Temps des gens ordinaires (2020) in Le Point, a publication 
generally sympathetic to Guilluy, Mahrane (2020) ironized that ‘même Christophe Guilluy, 
c’était mieux avant’. While the racialized assumptions underpinning his work were always 
problematic, his initial insight regarding the territorial splits in French society was not 
necessarily entirely worthless. His more recent works, however, have drawn increasingly 
simplistic, racialized binaries between peripheral France’s ‘gens ordinaires’, whom Guilluy 
idealizes, and a malevolent metropolitan ‘élite’. This has built brand Guilluy, but otherwise 
only further stripped of nuance an already polarized set of discussions.
Comparisons can be drawn with Houellebecq here. Guilluy’s descent into self- 
caricature has generated writing that retains the problematic racial underpinnings of 
his earlier work without its analytical value; the withering of literary ambiguity has, at least 
in this reader’s view, had a similar effect in Houellebecq’s writing. As discussed above, 
Williams (2019, 74–75) suggested that the polemical turn he noted in Soumission may 
represent the start of a ‘less undecidable, less ambiguous, and ultimately less inventive’ 
phase in Houellebecq’s writing. Sérotonine, like Soumission, is formulaically 
Houellebecqian at best, vindicating that prediction. The slide into self-caricature of both 
Houellebecq and Guilluy, partly generated by the market logics under which both 
operate, has also accentuated the aspects of both of their work that resonate with hard- 
right discourses.
Guilluy and Sérotonine
The apparent ideological affinities between Houellebecq and Guilluy hold interest given 
how significantly Sérotonine’s depiction of France and Guilluy’s ideas intersect. Florent’s 
lifestyle early in the novel reads like a caricature of that enjoyed by the affluent elite that 
Guilluy holds inhabit the Parisian metropolis. He shares a luxurious fifteenth arrondisse-
ment apartment with his entitled, decadent Japanese girlfriend, Yuzu, whose wealthy 
parents secured her an undemanding job nearby. Yuzu habitually sleeps in until midday, 
spends hours daily on her beauty regime, and attends ‘soirées libertines’; Florent leaves 
her after finding video footage of her engaging in group sex, first with multiple men and 
then, more disturbingly, with two dogs (Houellebecq 2019b, 49–52, 54–55 65-66).
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That the Japanese Yuzu seems more comfortable in Paris than Florent, who hides in 
the spare bedroom when she invites friends to the apartment, underlines the cosmo-
politan nature of the metropolitan elite (Houellebecq 2019b, 47). Guilluy (2014, 36) 
notes that, as one of the world’s major cities, Paris occupies a still more privileged 
position than France’s other metropolises. Yuzu reflects the globalized status of Paris, 
as does Tam, the English bureaucrat with whom Florent was unfaithful to Camille. Tam 
lives in London and Florent in Paris, but they met on E.U. business in Brussels, 
subsequently continuing the affair during Tam’s regular trips to the French capital 
(Houellebecq 2019b, 183–184). Florent was in Brussels specifically because of his 
Parisian job, having left a previous role in Normandy after realizing that he could 
not influence E.U. policy from the periphery: ‘Le vrai pouvoir était à Bruxelles, ou au 
moins dans des services de l’administration centrale en relation étroite avec Bruxelles’ 
(Houellebecq 2019b, 177). Paris, Brussels, and London emerge as three nodes in 
a transnational network of metropolises from which peripheral regions are excluded, 
and are home to a privileged elite able to easily move between these urban hubs. That 
the two characters most comfortable in these metropolises are the Japanese Yuzu and 
Tam, a black Englishwoman ‘d’origine jamaïcaine . . . ou peut-être la Barbade’, further 
recalls Guilluy’s racialization of these cities as non-white (Houellebecq 2019b, 
183–184).
The luxury enjoyed by the (non-white) Parisian elite, which Houellebecq caricatures 
through Yuzu, contrasts with the above-noted poverty of the (white) Norman dairy 
farmers Florent meets. He explicitly blames their predicament on the 2015 abolition of 
the quotas the E.U. previously imposed on milk production, claiming that the subsequent 
drop in prices ‘plonge[ait] des milliers d’éleveurs français dans la misère, et les rédui[sait] à 
la faillite’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 151–152). Local farmers’ union leader Frank agrees: follow-
ing another drop in milk prices, he supports a protest, reasoning that ‘si on laisse passer ça 
on est tous foutus, jusqu’au dernier’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 239–240). Florent and Frank are 
experts in E.U. policies and how they affect Norman dairy farmers, and both believe that 
the French government should implement protectionist measures to safeguard them 
from destitution. Florent has been vainly recommending such measures to his hierarchical 
superiors for years, and when he shares his belief that French dairy farmers are economic-
ally doomed, Frank plaintively responds: ‘vous pensez qu’il n’y aura jamais de mesures 
protectionnistes?’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 249–251). His protagonists’ advocacy of protec-
tionism is one of the key opinions that Houellebecq’s extra-literary interventions have 
encouraged readers to interpret as his own. In the Harper’s article, he praises Trump for 
favouring ‘old-fashioned protectionist measures’ when free trade would undermine 
American interests. He contrasts this with the dogmatism of free-market liberals whom 
he considers ‘as fanatical as communists’, consequently describing Trump as ‘one of the 
best American presidents I’ve ever seen’ despite considering him ‘pretty repulsive’ as 
a man (Houellebecq 2019a). He thus echoes Guilluy’s (2014, 87–88) conviction that 
economic protectionism is necessary to protect peripheral France against European and 
global competition. Mobilizing an apparent critique of free-market liberalism to defend 
reactionaries like Trump is, as noted above, also central to the discourse of the transna-
tional far right.
Florent echoes Houellebecq’s criticisms of economic liberals when explaining his own 
professional failure to support French agriculture against international competition. No- 
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one, he believes, could convince France’s bureaucrats to abandon a commitment to free 
trade that amounts to a ‘superstition de caste’:
Mes interlocuteurs ne se battaient pas pour leurs intérêts, ni même pour les intérêts qu’ils 
étaient supposés défendre . . . ils se battaient pour des idées; pendant des années j’avais été 
confronté à des gens qui étaient prêts à mourir pour la liberté du commerce (Houellebecq 
2019b, 249-250).
He laments that the ‘mesures de protection raisonnables’ that he has suggested have 
consistently been ignored by these ideologues in favour of ‘le triomphe du libre- 
échangisme’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 251).
Houellebecq’s portrayal of a French political class unwilling on ideological grounds to 
countenance any alternative to free trade resonates with Guilluy’s work. In Guilluy’s view, 
France’s ruling class, which is overwhelmingly based in the nation’s metropolises and 
particularly Paris, is unable to comprehend the struggles of its peripheral compatriots:
Comment ne pas bénir la mondialisation et l’ouverture des frontiers lorsque l’on observe les 
résultats de la region-métropole parisienne qui génère un tiers du PIB Français! Vus 
des métropoles, les débats autour du protectionnisme et de la régulation des échanges 
paraissent anachroniques (Guilluy 2014, 33-34)
When Guilluy originally made this argument, his references to the ruling class primarily 
designated the traditional mainstream parties: the PS and LR. Although both were 
subsequently humiliated in the 2017 presidential election, with Emmanuel Macron 
elected ahead of second-placed Marine Le Pen, Guilluy does not believe that this signalled 
a shift in the dominant ideology: Macron simply offered a rebranded version of the 
globalized economics championed by the previous mainstream parties, remaining ‘le 
candidat des métropoles mondialisées’ (Bherer 2017). Despite neither the PS nor LR 
now being in government, Guilluy thus believes that a metropolitan elite continues to 
impose free-market economics and all the ills they entail upon peripheral France.
Florent again echoes Guilluy, and the transnational far right, by suggesting that the RN 
might pose a viable challenge to globalized economics. As politicians feign concern for 
Norman dairy farmers after their protest degenerates into a bloodbath, with eleven 
protesters killed by riot police, he observes that ‘seul le Rassemblement national sembl[e] 
tout à fait clair’ regarding the need to abolish milk production quotas (Houellebecq 
2019b, 265–266). This resonates with Guilluy’s claim that, while LR and the PS are not 
‘des partis opposés mais complémentaires’, both promoting globalization, ‘Le FN [now 
the RN] s’inscrit au contraire dans une critique de ce modèle’ (2014, 83–84). It would be an 
overstatement to suggest that Sérotonine should be read as a declaration of 
Houellebecq’s support for the RN but, as Armus (2017, 130–131) notes is the case in 
Soumission, they emerge from the novel with more credit than their mainstream 
opponents.
Guilluy describes peripheral France as, like the RN, united against globalization despite 
significant social heterogeneity:
Hier opposées, elles partagent désormais le même destin. L’employé du lotissement pavil-
lonnaire, l’ouvrier rural, le chômeur du bassin minier, le petit fonctionnaire, mais aussi le petit 
paysan qui voisinent aujourd’hui dans la France périphérique contribuent à la recomposition 
sociale des milieux populaires (Guilluy 2014, 19).
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Sérotonine reproduces this vision of peripheral France as united despite its social diversity. 
A newsagent in a small Norman town confides to Florent that he ‘n’[est] pas insensible à la 
détresse de plus en plus criante des agriculteurs de la région’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 
186–187). When Florent later tells a hotelier in another nearby town that Aymeric, 
whose public suicide has turned him into a symbol, was his friend, the man’s reaction 
demonstrates that ‘comme tous les habitants de la région, il [est] solidaire des agriculteurs’ 
(Houellebecq 2019b, 268–269, my emphasis). The respect with which a local restauranteur 
subsequently treats him convinces him that ‘le bruit que j’étais un ami de “monsieur 
d’Harcourt” [doit] s’être répandu’. The restaurant’s patrons, meanwhile, discuss the actions 
of the CRS in hushed, angry tones; their simmering resentment underlines how widely 
support for the farmers is shared (Houellebecq 2019b, 269–270). This near-unanimous 
solidarity recalls Guilluy’s description of a peripheral France in which disparate popula-
tions of varying backgrounds, in areas that would traditionally be considered both rural 
and (peri-)urban, are united by their anger at their own marginalization.
While Houellebecq’s opposition to the E.U. is longstanding, his concern for peripheral 
France developed recently. When his previous novels contrast Paris, where most of his 
protagonists live, with some putatively more authentic France profonde, it is typically 
along traditional urban/rural lines. His most sustained engagement with this divide comes 
in La Carte et le territoire. Paris remains comparatively prosperous in the 2010 novel, but 
has lost its French character, with protagonists sadly noting the demise of beloved, 
stereotypically French institutions like the Parisian cafe (Houellebecq 2016 [2010], 111). 
By contrast, an embattled rural (rather than peripheral) France, is filled with ‘village[s] 
décrépit[s]’, and increasingly impoverished (Houellebecq 2016 [2010], 398). As Ruth 
Cruickshank (Cruickshank 2019, 103–105) notes, any surviving ‘French culture’ is commo-
dified in form, designed to satisfy the appetite of foreign tourists for ‘un pays enchanté . . . 
constell[é] de châteaux et de manoirs . . . où, partout, il fai[t] bon vivre’ (Houellebecq 2016 
[2010], 94).
Sérotonine includes similar depictions of a romanticized vision of rural France being 
commodified for touristic consumption. In the Relais Châteaux Florent and Yuzu visit early 
in the novel, for example, ‘il y [a] un cocktail de bienvenue, des serviteurs empressés et 
multiples, des cannelés et des macarons disposés à notre intention dans des coupelles de 
porcelaine, une bouteille de Ruinart nous atten[d] au frais dans le minibar’ (Houellebecq 
2019b, 43–44). The food served in these and other upmarket hotels also recalls La Carte et 
le Territoire. Cruickshank (2019) notes that, in the earlier novel, the commodification of 
gastronomic heritage is integral to the effective transformation of rural France into a kind 
of cultural theme park: tourists are served ‘a fiction of “French” food eaten neither 
historically nor in the fictional present by the French’, but which meets their expectations 
of a mythologized culinary tradition. Similarly, the hotels of Sérotonine play on their 
international clientele’s expectations of French cuisine through menus which ‘revisit[ent] 
de manière créative le terroir’, served by waiters who ‘déclame[nt] la composition du 
moindre amuse-bouche, le ton enflé d’une emphase mi-gastronomique mi-littéraire . . . 
dans le but . . . de faire du repas une expérience conviviale partagée’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 
44–45).
If certain problems facing rural France remain constant between La Carte et le territoire 
and Sérotonine, however, the latter diverges from the former by moving beyond the 
urban/rural divide to also contrast metropolis (or at least Paris) and periphery. Several 
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locations Florent visits, most notably Aymeric’s farm, are clearly rural. However, 
Houellebecq’s depiction of a disparate but united proletarian mass living both in rural 
France and larger towns like Caen or Niort resonates more with Guilluy’s descriptions of 
peripheral France. His appropriation of the metropolis/periphery binary popularized by 
Guilluy during the period separating La Carte et le territoire and Sérotonine is a new 
development with regard to his earlier fiction.
The absence of race
One might object that, even if Houellebecq does reproduce Guilluy’s distinction between 
metropolis and periphery, this need not imply that he also reproduces his racism. Indeed, 
Sérotonine differs from Houellebecq’s earlier novels precisely by evoking race far less 
frequently, depicting neither interracial conflict nor any protagonists who are overtly 
racist regarding French people of postcolonial immigrant descent. This sharply contrasts, 
for example, with Plateforme, which depicts France on the verge of civil war, as men ‘de 
type antillais’ commit gang rape with apparent impunity, Muslim men oppress ‘their’ 
women within the Hexagon, and jihadi terrorists massacre tourists overseas (Houellebecq 
2001, 29–30, 205–207, 276–277, 340–341). While this is Houellebecq’s most visceral novel, 
none of his pre-Sérotonine fiction is free of such material: even La Carte et le territoire, in 
which Williams (2019) notes ‘Houellebecq’s hallmark topics’ of racism and misogyny are 
less prominent than elsewhere, occasionally evokes a certain level of racial tension. The 
protagonist is, for example, intimidated outside his late father’s home by ‘un grand Noir 
qui l’observ[e], de l’autre côté de la rue’ (Houellebecq 2016 [2010], 403–404).
Sérotonine does not even include this kind of innuendo. The only non-white French 
protagonists in the novel are Arab brothers who own a cybercafe in the town of 
Coutances, and who are anomalous enough to seem like comic relief. Florent notes that 
they:
se ressembl[ent] tellement qu’ils [doivent] être jumeaux, et [leur] look salafiste [est] si outré 
qu’ils [sont] probablement inoffensifs. Je m’imagin[e] qu’ils [doivent] être célibataires et vivre 
ensemble, ou peut-être mariés à deux soeurs jumelles et vivre dans des maisons mitoyennes 
(Houellebecq 2019b, 270-271).
There are, however, three mentions of the banlieues which Guilluy racializes so explicitly. 
Florent, thinking back to student days when he would return by bus to the Institut 
national agronomique in Paris after spending the weekend at his parents’ peri-urban 
home, recalls that:
lorsque je traversais Villiers-le-Bel, puis Sarcelles, puis Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, puis Saint-Denis, 
lorsque je voyais peu à peu autour de moi s’élever la densité de population et les barres 
d’immeubles et dans l’autobus la violence des conversations augmenter, et le niveau de 
danger visiblement s’accroître, j’avais chaque fois la sensation nettement caractérisée de 
revenir en enfer (Houellebecq 2019b, 46).
He subsequently reflects gladly that becoming comparatively affluent ‘m’[a] permis 
d’échapper, je l’esp[ère] définitivement, au contact physique et même visuel des classes 
dangereuses’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 46). If the banlieues are almost completely absent from 
Sérotonine, it is partly because Florent finds them distasteful enough to actively avoid 
them.
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The dangerous banlieues also contrast with Aymeric’s rural département, which, 
although poor, is ‘paisible . . . la criminalité [est] presque inexistante’; Aymeric tells 
Florent that ‘les gens laiss[ent] souvent leur porte ouverte lorsqu’ils s’absent[ent] dans 
la journée, ce qui [est] devenu rare même en zone rurale’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 266–267). 
While Florent describes the crime-free nature of the area as exceptional, his use of the 
qualifier ‘même’ indicates that rural districts remain safer than urban counterparts of 
which only the banlieues have been flagged as dangerous. This contrast between perilous, 
implicitly racialized, banlieues and a comparatively law-abiding rural France is an estab-
lished far-right trope. Reacting in April 2017 to suburban riots, for example, Marion 
Maréchal-Le Pen asked ‘Pourquoi nos campagnes qui souffrent tellement ne déclenchent- 
elles jamais d’émeutes, ne brûlent-elles jamais de voitures?’, implying a racial or cultural 
rather than socio-economic determinism without making it explicit (@MarionMarechal, 
25 April 2017). Her ostentatious concern for ‘nos campagnes qui souffrent’ represented 
another example of far-right politicians feigning concern for populations racialized as 
belonging to an imagined white working class purely to scapegoat ethnic minorities.
Sérotonine does not racialize the contrast any more explicitly than Maréchal-Le Pen. 
The novel does, however, hint that peripheral France should be read as white by depicting 
white, European immigrants as, unlike the obviously incongruous Arab cybercafé owners, 
entirely at home there. During Florent’s relationship with Camille, her Portuguese parents 
warmly welcomed him to their Bagnoles-de-l’Orne home. He recalls that ‘j’ai remarqua-
blement mangé pendant ce séjour’, linking Camille’s peripheral, white immigrant family 
to an idealized heritage of French gastronomic conviviality which seems elsewhere to be 
dying out (Houellebecq 2019b, 186–187). The food of globalized Paris reflects its belong-
ing to a transnational network of metropolises, and consequent loss of any French cultural 
specificity. While in the capital, Florent binges on multiple varieties of hummus: 
a foodstuff of which the roots clearly lie outside France, while the availability of multiple 
varieties equally suggests an uprootedness from any North African or Middle Eastern 
heritage. Restaurants, meanwhile, offer ‘un fooding novateur’ haphazardly fusing the 
cuisines of various cultures into chaotic mixtures like ‘crevettes panko avec leur sauce 
salsa verde’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 86–87).
If an idealized French culinary heritage survives in the peripheral home of white, 
Portuguese immigrants, the practices of the only non-white characters seen in the 
periphery recall the culturally rootless Parisian metropolis. The cybercafé-owning Arab 
brothers offer Florent mint tea before serving him an orange Sprite. They apparently stock 
this American beverage over an iconically French alternative, Orangina, while mint tea is 
typically associated with Maghrebi culture; Houellebecq’s association of these elements 
with the novel’s only Arab protagonists links multi-ethnic France and globalization in 
a fashion reminiscent of Guilluy’s work (Houellebecq 2019b, 57, 89–90, 184–185, 272). 
That they own a cybercafe, while strangely anachronistic in 2019, equally ties them to the 
online networks so symbolic of the globalized present. Where white, European immi-
grants fit seamlessly into peripheral France and an imagined French heritage, non-white 
French people, like the Parisian metropolis, are associated with the economic processes 
that both Guilluy and Houellebecq believe are undermining it. Notions of Frenchness are 
associated with the periphery, but both are associated with whiteness.
That Florent’s concern for the problems of the white periphery is counterbalanced by 
a total disinterest in the racialized banlieues implies that the two do not experience the 
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same problems. As noted above, Guilluy makes this argument explicitly, arguing that the 
banlieues and their inhabitants are actually prospering economically at the expense of the 
periphery. He even claims that politicians and media outlets focus solely on the problems 
of non-white banlieusards while ignoring those of peripheral France:
La question sociale sembl[e] définitivement circonscrite aux banlieues. À tel point que 
l’ensemble de la classe médiatique et politique ne cess[e] de ressasser que la question sociale, 
celles des “classes populaires”, se résum[e] qux “quartiers” (lire les territoires où se concentr-
ent les minorités ethniques) (Guilluy 2014, 10-11).
The near-complete absence of either the banlieues or protagonists of postcolonial immi-
grant descent from Sérotonine represents, this essay suggests, Houellebecq’s attempt to 
right that putative imbalance. A crucial scene in this respect comes near the novel’s end, 
when Florent returns to Paris and moves into a thirteenth arrondissement studio apart-
ment. He is disappointed to notice that ‘La vue de mes fenêtres [est] inutilement étendue, 
sur la banlieue Sud’; however, he reflects that this does not matter because ‘il y [a] des 
volets roulants’, which he resolves to ‘clore à jamais’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 331). Like in the 
earlier scene, where he gladly notes that he no longer needs to encounter the inhabitants 
of the banlieues, this underlines that Florent is ignoring them deliberately rather than 
simply not crossing paths with them. Houellebecq’s choice to mark, on two separate 
occasions, the exclusion of metropolitan working-class neighbourhoods coded as non- 
white from his novel suggests that they are simply not part of the story he wants to tell 
about the impact of globalization on the French working class: a category from which, like 
the hard and far-right figures discussed above, he excludes the inhabitants of these 
neighbourhoods. Houellebecq’s novel sets out to correct the disparity that Guilluy claims 
exists between the attention dominant discourses grant the banlieues and peripheral 
France respectively by pointedly ignoring the former in favour of the latter.
Florent’s only other mention of the banlieues comes when he recalls accompanying 
Yuzu to a ‘soirée libertine’ where most male attendees were younger and less affluent 
than their female counterparts, and had ‘un look nettement “banlieue”’: a description with 
obvious racial undertones independently of any reference to Guilluy. Florent wonders if 
these men are being paid, but decides that they are unlikely to be victims of exploitation: 
‘baiser gratuitement pour la plupart des hommes est déjà une aubaine’ (Houellebecq 
2019b, 51–52). Houellebecq’s vision of contemporary sexual relations as reproducing free 
market logics has been a constant throughout his oeuvre, since the protagonist of 
Extension du domaine de la lutte stated that:
Tout comme le libéralisme économique sans frein, et pour des raisons analogues, le 
libéralisme sexuel produit des phénomènes de paupérisation absolue . . . C’est ce qu’on 
appelle la “loi du marché” . . . Le libéralisme économique, c’est l’extension du domaine de la 
lutte . . . De même, le libéralisme sexuel, c’est l’extension du domaine de la lutte (Houellebecq 
2004 [1994], 134-135).
The comparative success of these young men in the metropolitan sexual market suggests 
that, while material poverty may prevent them from fully belonging to the city centre 
elite, they are at least partially included by it. This partial inclusion contrasts with the total 
exclusion of Aymeric, whose wife left him for an internationally renowned London-based 
pianist, who ‘fait des concerts partout dans le monde’ (Houellebecq 2019b, 206–207). He 
has not met anyone new since she left, and apparently has few opportunities to do so. 
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Men coded as non-white are thus included in the metropolitan sexual market while white 
Frenchmen in the periphery face the ‘paupérisation absolue’ described in Extension du 
domaine de la lutte, as women like Aymeric’s wife choose privileged metropolitans over 
them. Sérotonine echoes Guilluy both by studiously ignoring the racialized banlieues to 
focus on an implicitly white peripheral France and by depicting banlieusards as included 
by the metropolitan model which is suffocating those peripheral regions: again, 
Houellebecq’s visions of the economic and sexual marketplaces mirror each other. The 
compassion that the novel expresses for peripheral France is predicated on this vision of 
racialized banlieusards as not sharing, and perhaps even complicit in causing, its pro-
blems. While the novel includes fewer explicit comments about race than Houellebecq’s 
earlier works, its vision of race relations in France remains deeply problematic, resonating 
with those currently being expounded by the French and international hard and far-right.
Conclusion
To conclude, Sérotonine is Houellebecq’s most overtly politically engaged novel to date, 
expressing an apparently genuine distress regarding the damage that globalization and 
more specifically the E.U. have done to Guilluy’s France périphérique. That sympathy, 
however, is like Guilluy’s predicated upon the exclusion of communities of postcolonial 
immigrant descent from the category of ‘French working class’. They are treated as eternal 
outsiders, either facing different problems to their white, peripheral compatriots or 
actively profiting at their expense. Unlike Guilluy, Houellebecq does not say this explicitly; 
instead, he excludes non-white French people and the racialized banlieues from his novel 
by having a protagonist who cares deeply about peripheral France’s problems avoid even 
looking at them. The absence of racially charged comments from Sérotonine does not 
reflect an absence of racism, but an unwillingness Houellebecq shares with Guilluy to 
accept that non-white French people can be wholly French, or share the problems of their 
white compatriots. Sérotonine, like Guilluy’s polemical interventions, must therefore be 
read alongside the political discourse of a contemporary far right that feigns concern for 
a so-called white working class to promote racist policies. Houellebecq, in positioning 
himself as an écrivain médiatique, once deftly trod the line between encouraging readers 
to identify author with oeuvre and defending the imaginative autonomy of literature. His 
most recent two novels, however, have by accident or design eroded the devices he once 
used to maintain literary ambiguity in favour of a blunt, quasi-literary polemicism. The 
result, in Sérotonine, is a novel including little explicitly racialized content (at least against 
postcolonial immigrants to France or their French descendants), but which contains 
sufficient evidence to suggest a highly problematic attitude to race on its author’s part.
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